Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry C Fluet, PG Garella International journal of industrial organization 20 (7), 907-930, 2002 | 184 | 2002 |
Monitoring versus incentives D Demougin, C Fluet European Economic Review 45 (9), 1741-1764, 2001 | 184 | 2001 |
Preponderance of evidence D Demougin, C Fluet European Economic Review 50 (4), 963-976, 2006 | 142 | 2006 |
Output and wages with inequality averse agents D Demougin, C Fluet, C Helm Canadian Journal of Economics, 399-413, 2006 | 102 | 2006 |
Deterrence versus judicial error: A comparative view of standards of proof D Demougin, C Fluet Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für …, 2005 | 89 | 2005 |
Inequity aversion in tournaments D Demougin, C Fluet CIRPEE Working Paper 03-22, 2003 | 89 | 2003 |
Mechanism sufficient statistic in the risk-neutral agency problem D Demougin, C Fluet Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für …, 1998 | 80 | 1998 |
Rules of proof, courts, and incentives D Demougin, C Fluet The RAND Journal of Economics 39 (1), 20-40, 2008 | 72 | 2008 |
Long-term care insurance: Information frictions and selection MM Boyer, P De Donder, C Fluet, ML Leroux, PC Michaud American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 12 (3), 134-169, 2020 | 67 | 2020 |
Accuracy versus falsification costs: The optimal amount of evidence under different procedures W Emons, C Fluet The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 25 (1), 134-156, 2009 | 66 | 2009 |
Predicted risk perception and risk-taking behavior: The case of impaired driving G Dionne, C Fluet, D Desjardins Journal of risk and uncertainty 35, 237-264, 2007 | 63 | 2007 |
Group vs. individual performance pay when workers are envious D Demougin, C Fluet Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 3, 18, 2003 | 54 | 2003 |
Complete versus incomplete insurance contracts under adverse selection with multiple risks C Fluet, F Pannequin The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 22, 81-101, 1997 | 48 | 1997 |
Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition D Demougin, C Fluet Economic Theory 17, 489-496, 2001 | 41 | 2001 |
Legal liability when individuals have moral concerns B Deffains, C Fluet The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 29 (4), 930-955, 2013 | 40 | 2013 |
Long-term care insurance: Knowledge barriers, risk perception and adverse selection M Boyer, P De Donder, C Fluet, ML Leroux, PC Michaud National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017 | 38 | 2017 |
Enforcing contracts: should courts seek the truth? C Fluet Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für …, 2003 | 37 | 2003 |
A further justification for the negligence rule D Demougin, C Fluet International Review of Law and Economics 19 (1), 33-45, 1999 | 37 | 1999 |
Social norms and legal design B Deffains, C Fluet The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 36 (1), 139-169, 2020 | 32* | 2020 |
Long-term care risk misperceptions M Boyer, P De Donder, C Fluet, ML Leroux, PC Michaud The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice 44, 183-215, 2019 | 32 | 2019 |