Fahad Khalil
Fahad Khalil
Verifisert e-postadresse på uw.edu
Tittel
Sitert av
Sitert av
År
Gathering information before signing a contract
J Crémer, F Khalil
The American Economic Review, 566-578, 1992
3161992
Auditing without commitment
F Khalil
The RAND Journal of Economics, 629-640, 1997
2771997
Contracts and productive information gathering
J Crémer, F Khalil, JC Rochet
Games and Economic Behavior 25 (2), 174-193, 1998
2531998
Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
J Crémer, F Khalil, JC Rochet
Journal of Economic Theory 81 (1), 163-200, 1998
2371998
Collusive auditors
F Khalil, J Lawarree
The American Economic Review 85 (2), 442-446, 1995
1121995
INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*
F Khalil, J Lawarree
The Journal of Industrial Economics 54 (2), 269-291, 2006
932006
Loan size as a commitment device
F Khalil, BM Parigi
International Economic Review, 135-150, 1998
911998
Input versus output monitoring: who is the residual claimant?
F Khalil, J Lawarree
Journal of Economic Theory 66 (1), 139-157, 1995
891995
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
F Khalil, J Lawarrée, S Yun
The Rand journal of economics 41 (1), 179-198, 2010
802010
Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
F Khalil, D Martimort, B Parigi
Journal of Economic Theory 135 (1), 35-67, 2007
692007
Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature
J Crémer, F Khalil
European Economic Review 38 (3-4), 675-682, 1994
661994
Optimal task design: To integrate or separate planning and implementation?
F Khalil, D Kim, D Shin
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 15 (2), 457-478, 2006
472006
Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring
F Khalil, J Lawarree
Journal of Public Economics 82 (3), 327-347, 2001
392001
Third party purchasing of health services: patient choice and agency
M Chalkley, F Khalil
Journal of Health Economics 24 (6), 1132-1153, 2005
342005
Contracts offered by bureaucrats
F Khalil, D Kim, J Lawarrée
The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (4), 686-711, 2013
142013
On commitment and collusion in auditing
F Khalil, J Lawarree
Working Papers, 2000
132000
Service-level selection: strategic risk selection in Medicare Advantage in response to risk adjustment
S Park, A Basu, N Coe, F Khalil
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017
122017
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information
F Khalil, J Lawarree, TJ Scott
The RAND Journal of Economics 46 (4), 872-890, 2015
112015
The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: evidence from a longitudinal household survey
AKM Hussain, N Nargis, SM Ashiquzzaman, F Khalil
GLO Discussion Paper, 2017
92017
Monitoring a common agent
F Khalil, D Martimort, B Parigi
Available at SSRN 395505, 2003
82003
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Artikler 1–20