Peter Cramton

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Lawrence M. AusubelProfessor of EconomicsVerifisert e-postadresse på econ.umd.edu
Axel OckenfelsUniversity of Cologne and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective GoodsVerifisert e-postadresse på uni-koeln.de
Steven StoftretiredVerifisert e-postadresse på stoft.com
Paul MilgromProfessor of Economics, Stanford UniversityVerifisert e-postadresse på stanford.edu
Joseph TracyAmerican Enterprise InstituteVerifisert e-postadresse på dal.frb.org
Yoav ShohamProfessor (emeritus)Verifisert e-postadresse på cs.stanford.edu
Robert WilsonAdams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford UniversityVerifisert e-postadresse på stanford.edu
Suzi KerrSenior Vice President, Economics: Environmental Defense FundVerifisert e-postadresse på edf.org
David MacKayProfessor of Natural Philosophy, Cavendish Laboratory, University of CambridgeVerifisert e-postadresse på mrao.cam.ac.uk
Richard SteinbergChair in Operations Research, London School of EconomicsVerifisert e-postadresse på lse.ac.uk
Eric BudishPaul G. McDermott Professor of Economics and Entrepreneurship, Chicago BoothVerifisert e-postadresse på chicagobooth.edu
Ian AyresWilliam K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law SchoolVerifisert e-postadresse på yale.edu
Pacharasut SujarittanontaChulalongkorn UniversityVerifisert e-postadresse på chula.ac.th
Marek PyciaUniversity of ZurichVerifisert e-postadresse på econ.uzh.ch
Marzena RostekProfessor of Economics, University of Wisconsin-MadisonVerifisert e-postadresse på ssc.wisc.edu
R. Richard GeddesCornell UniversityVerifisert e-postadresse på cornell.edu
Robert GibbonsProfessor of Organizational Economics, MIT Sloan and Economics DepartmentVerifisert e-postadresse på mit.edu
John ShimUniversity of Notre DameVerifisert e-postadresse på nd.edu
Andrzej (Andy) SkrzypaczProfessor of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of BusinessVerifisert e-postadresse på stanford.edu
Thomas PalfreyCalifornia Institute of TechnologyVerifisert e-postadresse på hss.caltech.edu

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Peter Cramton

Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

Verifisert e-postadresse på umd.edu - Startside

Market design auctions bargaining game theory industrial organization


Tittel Sorter etter sitater Sorter etter år Sorter etter tittel	Sitert av Sitert av	År
Combinatorial auctions P Cramton, Y Shoham, R Steinberg MIT Press, 2006	1539	2006
Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions LM Ausubel, P Cramton, M Pycia, M Rostek, M Weretka Review of Economic Studies 81 (4), 1366-1400, 2014	1278	2014
The high-frequency trading arms race: Frequent batch auctions as a market design response E Budish, P Cramton, J Shim Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (4), 1547-1621, 2015	1060	2015
Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather P Cramton, S Kerr Energy Policy 30 (4), 333-345, 2002	848	2002
Dissolving a partnership efficiently P Cramton, R Gibbons, P Klemperer Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 615-632, 1987	666	1987
The FCC spectrum auctions: An early assessment P Cramton Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 6 (3), 431-495, 1997	493	1997
Electricity market design P Cramton Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33 (4), 589-612, 2017	477	2017
The efficiency of the FCC spectrum auctions P Cramton The Journal of Law and Economics 41 (S2), 727-736, 1998	450	1998
Capacity market fundamentals P Cramton, A Ockenfels, S Stoft Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy 2 (2), 27-46, 2013	443	2013
Bargaining with incomplete information LM Ausubel, P Cramton, RJ Deneckere Handbook of game theory with economic applications 3, 1897-1945, 2002	440	2002
Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty PC Cramton The Review of Economic Studies 59 (1), 205-225, 1992	414	1992
A capacity market that makes sense P Cramton, S Stoft The Electricity Journal 18 (7), 43-54, 2005	403	2005
Bargaining with incomplete information: An infinite-horizon model with two-sided uncertainty PC Cramton The Review of Economic Studies 51 (4), 579-593, 1984	398	1984
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design L Ausubel, P Cramton, P Milgrom Combinatorial Auctions, 115-138, 2006	387	2006
Collusive bidding: Lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions P Cramton, JA Schwartz Journal of Regulatory Economics 17 (3), 229-252, 2000	364	2000
The convergence of market designs for adequate generating capacity with special attention to the CAISO's resource adequacy problem PC Cramton, S Stoft MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2006	349	2006
Money out of thin air: The nationwide narrowband PCS auction PC Cramton Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 4 (2), 267-343, 1995	345	1995
Spectrum auction design P Cramton Review of industrial organization 42, 161-190, 2013	326	2013
Ascending auctions P Cramton European Economic Review 42 (3-5), 745-756, 1998	317	1998
Economics and design of capacity markets for the power sector P Cramton, A Ockenfels Interdisziplinäre Aspekte der Energiewirtschaft, 191-212, 2016	312	2016

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