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Horacio Larreguy
Horacio Larreguy
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Verifisert e-postadresse på itam.mx - Startside
Tittel
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År
Testing models of social learning on networks: Evidence from two experiments
AG Chandrasekhar, H Larreguy, JP Xandri
Econometrica 88 (1), 1-32, 2020
307*2020
Parties, brokers, and voter mobilization: How turnout buying depends upon the party’s capacity to monitor brokers
H Larreguy, J Marshall, P Querubin
American Political Science Review 110 (1), 160-179, 2016
277*2016
Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes
K Croke, G Grossman, HA Larreguy, J Marshall
American Political Science Review 110 (3), 579-600, 2016
2762016
Publicising malfeasance: when the local media structure facilitates electoral accountability in Mexico
H Larreguy, J Marshall, JM Snyder Jr
The Economic Journal 130 (631), 2291-2327, 2020
236*2020
Social networks as contract enforcement: Evidence from a lab experiment in the field
AG Chandrasekhar, C Kinnan, H Larreguy
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10 (4), 43-78, 2018
211*2018
Agents of the regime? Traditional leaders and electoral politics in South Africa
D De Kadt, HA Larreguy
The Journal of Politics 80 (2), 382-399, 2018
189*2018
The effect of education on civic and political engagement in nonconsolidated democracies: Evidence from Nigeria
H Larreguy, J Marshall
Review of Economics and Statistics 99 (3), 387-401, 2017
144*2017
Countering misinformation via WhatsApp: Preliminary evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe
J Bowles, H Larreguy, S Liu
PloS one 15 (10), e0240005, 2020
1292020
Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials
T Dunning, G Grossman, M Humphreys, SD Hyde, C McIntosh, G Nellis, ...
Science advances 5 (7), eaaw2612, 2019
1242019
Monitoring political brokers: Evidence from clientelistic networks in Mexico
HA Larreguy
EPSA 2013 Annual General Conference Paper 655, 2012
1212012
Priors rule: When do malfeasance revelations help or hurt incumbent parties?
E Arias, H Larreguy, J Marshall, P Querubin
Journal of the European Economic Association 20 (4), 1433-1477, 2022
118*2022
Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union
PQ Horacio Larreguy, Cesar E. Montiel Olea
American Journal of Political Science 61 (4), 877–891, 2017
114*2017
Leveling the playing field: How campaign advertising can help non-dominant parties
HA Larreguy, J Marshall, JM Snyder Jr
Journal of the European Economic Association 16 (6), 1812-1849, 2018
92*2018
Information provision, voter coordination, and electoral accountability: Evidence from Mexican social networks
E Arias, P Balán, H Larreguy, J Marshall, P Querubín
American Political Science Review 113 (2), 475-498, 2019
87*2019
Political competition and state capacity: evidence from a land allocation program in Mexico
L Fergusson, H Larreguy, JF Riaño
The Economic Journal 132 (648), 2815-2834, 2022
82*2022
Breaking clientelism or rewarding incumbents? Evidence from an urban titling program in Mexico
H Larreguy, J Marshall, L Trucco
Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 2015
79*2015
Toolbox of individual-level interventions against online misinformation
A Kozyreva, P Lorenz-Spreen, SM Herzog, UKH Ecker, S Lewandowsky, ...
Nature Human Behaviour, 1-9, 2024
78*2024
Eat widely, vote wisely? Lessons from a campaign against vote buying in Uganda
C Blattman, H Larreguy, B Marx, OR Reid
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019
61*2019
An informational theory of electoral targeting in young clientelistic democracies: Evidence from Senegal
J Gottlieb, H Larreguy
Quarterly Journal of Political Science 15 (1), 73-104, 2020
52*2020
Able and Mostly Willing: An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter‐Driven Accountability in Senegal
A Bhandari, H Larreguy, J Marshall
American Journal of Political Science 67 (4), 1040-1066, 2023
49*2023
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Artikler 1–20