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Eduardo Perez-Richet
Eduardo Perez-Richet
Sciences Po, Department of Economics
Verifisert e-postadresse på sciencespo.fr - Startside
Tittel
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Sitert av
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Altruism in networks
R Bourlès, Y Bramoullé, E Perez‐Richet
Econometrica 85 (2), 675-689, 2017
1292017
Certifiable pre‐play communication: Full disclosure
J Hagenbach, F Koessler, E Perez‐Richet
Econometrica 82 (3), 1093-1131, 2014
1272014
Interim bayesian persuasion: First steps
E Perez-Richet
American Economic Review 104 (5), 469-474, 2014
902014
Test design under falsification
E Perez‐Richet, V Skreta
Econometrica 90 (3), 1109-1142, 2022
87*2022
Communication with Evidence in the Lab
J Hagenbach, E Perez-Richet
Games and Economic Behavior 112, 139-165, 2018
412018
Complicating to persuade
E Perez-Richet, D Prady
Available at SSRN 1868066, 2011
312011
Altruism and risk sharing in networks
R Bourlès, Y Bramoullé, E Perez-Richet
Journal of the European Economic Association 19 (3), 1488-1521, 2021
242021
Evidence reading mechanisms
F Koessler, E Perez-Richet
Social Choice and Welfare, 1-23, 2019
22*2019
Choosing choices: Agenda selection with uncertain issues
R Godefroy, E Perez‐Richet
Econometrica 81 (1), 221-253, 2013
162013
Competing with equivocal information
E Perez-Richet
112012
A proof of Blackwell’s theorem
E Perez-Richet
Working Paper, 2017
82017
A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
E Perez-Richet
Economics Letters 110 (1), 15-17, 2011
72011
Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
E Perez-Richet, V Skreta
Working paper, 2023
32023
Information design with agency
J Bizzotto, E Perez-Richet, A Vigier
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13868, 2019
32019
Communication via Third Parties
J Bizzotto, E Perez-Richet, A Vigier
Available at SSRN 3530804, 2021
22021
Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms: Optimal Design and Investment Incentives
V Augias, E Perez-Richet
arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.11805, 2023
2023
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Artikler 1–16